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Abstmct-Using dynamic programming, feedback
Stackelberg strategies are derived for the general linear quadratic discrete-time game.
I. I~TRODUCTION
The difficulty in finding a solution to closed-loop Stackelberg strategies is primarily due to the fact that the leader's strategy does not satisfy of Electrical Engineering and the Coordinated the principle of optimality. A similar strategy, called feedback Stackelberg, has been proposed where a constraint has been added that the strategies followed by both players must satisfy the principle of optimality. This strategy is useful in game situations where one player, or group of players, has more information than the other players and may act as leader. Possible applications can be found in economics, power systems, etc.
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RECURSIVE ALGoRImt
A two-player nonzero-sum linear discrete-time game is considered. It is assumed that player two, controlling uZk, is the leader and player one, controlling ulk, the follower. The state equation is given by
(1)
The cost function which each player desires to minimize is given by The optimal cost to go from time k is assumed to be of the form
Recursive equations for Kikr Pik, and 5, are found, using the principle of optimahty where
~( x ( k ) , k ) =~, ( x ( k + 1 ) , k + 1 ) +~~( x ( k ) , k , u , , , u~) , i=1,2. (4)
The Stackelberg controls ulS and u2 are the controls for players one and two, respectively, when player two is the leader. They are derived from the necessary conditions [2] given by
In the equations above, it is necessary that and Sk+ exist at each time period during the game. We w i l l now give sufficient conditions which guarantee existence of these matrices. First we note that K&, i = 1,2 is independent of Cvk and a,, i = 1,2, j = 1,2. Setting Cuk=O and =O in (2) (7) are then unique for the game defined by (1) and (2) .
Note that Mkk+l and Z , , + , , i = 1,2, depend only on system matrices and cost functions and hence are independent of the initial state. Thus, the gain matrices and open-loop components of the feedback controls are the same for a given problem formulation even if the initial state is changed.
The procedure for finding the optimal control is summarized as 
7)
Repeat steps 1)-6) for k = N -2, N -3, etc. 8) The feedback controls can then be computed from (7) for k = 9) The state trajectory can then be computed from (I). 10) Finally, the total cost to each player may be computed from follows. 
CONCLUSIONS
Coupled recursive equations have been found which generate the optimal feedback Stackelberg control strategies for the tracking problem of the generalized linear quadratic discrete time game. Sufficient conditions have been given which insure existence of the control strategies. Of special interest is that with the form for the controls given by (7, the solution for control matrices, i.e., Mi,k+ I, Zj,k+ i = 1,2, is independent of the initial state x. and dependent only on system matrices and cost functions.
